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ARCHELAUS ON COSMOGONY AND THE
ORIGINS OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
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I
A L entitled his magisterial book on Diogenes of Apol-
lonia Diogène d’Apollonie: la dernière cosmologie présocratique. The
second revised edition, published in , contains some important
additions, modiﬁcations, and corrections. There is also a change
in the subtitle. Instead of la dernière cosmologie présocratique the
new subtitle is simply édition, traduction et commentaire des frag-
ments et témoignages. A fully justiﬁed change, I think. The point
is not merely that modern commentators debate where to draw
the line; more interestingly, already our ancient sources stan-
dardly point out that not Diogenes but Archelaus of Athens was
the last Presocratic natural philosopher who propounded a full-
ﬂedged cosmology. This is, for instance, how Diogenes Laertius
introduces him:
Α᾿ρχέλαος Α᾿θηναῖος ἢ Μιλήσιος, πατρὸς Α᾿πολλοδώρου, ὡς δέ τινες, Μίδωνος,
μαθητὴς Α᾿ναξαγόρου, διδάσκαλος Σωκράτους. οὗτος πρῶτος ἐκ τῆς ᾿ Ιωνίας τὴν
φυσικὴν φιλοσοφίαν μετήγαγεν Α᾿θήναζε, καὶ ἐκλήθη φυσικός, παρὸ καὶ ἔληξεν ἐν
αὐτῷ ἡ φυσικὴ φιλοσοφία, Σωκράτους τὴν ἠθικὴν εἰσαγαγόντος. (D.L. . =
 A  DK, part)
Archelaus of Athens or Miletus, son of Apollodorus or, according to some,
of Midon. He was a pupil of Anaxagoras and teacher of Socrates. He was
the ﬁrst to transfer natural philosophy from Ionia to Athens, and he was
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called a natural philosopher, so natural philosophy also came to an end with
him as Socrates introduced moral philosophy.
Hippolytus, our other main source on Archelaus, closes his account
in a similar vein:
ἡ μὲν οὖν φυσικὴ φιλοσοφία ἀπὸ Θάλητος ἕως Α᾿ρχελάου διέμεινε· τούτου γίνεται
Σωκράτης ἀκροατής. (Hipp.Haer. .  Marcovich)
So, then, natural philosophy continued to exist from Thales until
Archelaus; it is of this latter that Socrates became the disciple.
Of course, Archelaus’ role as the presumed teacher of Socrates
makes him almost analytically the last Presocratic. Yet, as I shall
argue, the doxographical tradition singles out Archelaus as the one
who is not only the last in the line of Presocratic natural philoso-
phers, but also someone who went beyond this tradition. This is
how Diogenes Laertius continues his introduction (D.L. . =
 A  DK, part):
ἔοικεν δὲ καὶ οὗτος ἅψασθαι τῆς ἠθικῆς. καὶ γὰρ περὶ νόμων πεφιλοσόφηκεν καὶ
καλῶν καὶ δικαίων· παρ ᾿ οὗ λαβὼν Σωκράτης τῷ αὐξῆσαι εἰς τὸ 〈ἄκρον〉 εὑρεῖν
ὑπελήφθη.
But he [sc. Archelaus], too, seems to have touched upon ethics. For he
philosophized also about laws and about the ﬁne and the just. Socrates took
this over from him, but developed it to such an extent that he was supposed
to have invented it.
Remarkably, in his review of the three parts of philosophy, Sextus
Empiricus singles out Archelaus among the Presocratics as having
combined natural philosophy and ethics:
τῶν δὲ διμερῆ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὑποστησαμένων Ξενοφάνης μὲν ὁ Κολοφώνιος τὸ
φυσικὸν ἅμα καὶ λογικόν, ὥς φασί τινες, μετήρχετο, Α᾿ρχέλαος δὲ ὁ Α᾿θηναῖος
τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν· μεθ ᾿ οὗ τινες καὶ τὸν ᾿ Επίκουρον τάττουσιν ὡς [καὶ] τὴν
λογικὴν θεωρίαν ἐκβάλλοντα. (S.E.M. . Mau–Mutschmann= A DK,
part)
Of those who maintained that philosophy has two parts, Xenophanes of
Colophon, as some people say, pursued the physical and the logical parts,
whereas Archelaus of Athens pursued the physical and the ethical parts; with
him some people also classify Epicurus as rejecting logical reﬂection. (trans.
Bett)
 〈ἄκρον〉 is a supplement by Diels, accepted by Dorandi in his  Cambridge
edition.
Created on 22 November 2016 at 13.15 hours page 2
Archelaus on Cosmogony and Social Institutions 
The question I am interested in is not whether Sextus and his
source were right in claiming that Archelaus was the only Preso-
cratic to pursue natural philosophy and ethics, or at least the prime
example of that combination. Formost of us would agree thatHera-
clitus, Empedocles, Democritus, and others had interesting ethi-
cal views as well. Rather, what I ﬁnd worth investigating is what
feature, or features, of Archelaus’ work marked him out for this
role in the eyes of the ancients. There could of course be an easy
historiographical answer to this question. One could simply say
that the authors of diadochai—those who arranged the philosophers
into chains of teacher–disciple relations—felt the need to make the
transition within the Ionian tradition to Socrates smoother, and
therefore attributed a little bit of ethics to the presumed teacher
of Socrates. I shall try to show, however, that the attribution of
some speciﬁc contribution in the sphere of ethics to Archelaus is not
simply the invention of the authors of diadochai. What I shall argue
for on the basis of some scattered pieces of evidence is that what
distinguished Archelaus was that he appended to his cosmogonical
narrative a Kulturentstehungslehre, a story about the origins of so-
cial, political, and cultural institutions.
I shall argue that tying together a cosmogony (including the
emergence of living beings) and a Kulturentstehungslehre was not
a traditional feature of Presocratic treatises, as has sometimes
been maintained, but a novelty introduced during the lifetime
of Socrates. I shall also examine why authors—both before and
after Socrates—could ﬁnd it preferable to keep the two accounts
separate. This issue will lead me also to a brief examination of the
relationship between the narratives of Timaeus and Critias, where
the stories about the cosmos and living beings and the origins
of communities, I shall argue, are consciously kept apart. I shall
also brieﬂy discuss other contemporaries of Archelaus, such as
Antiphon and Democritus, who might have contributed to the
same project of bridging the two narratives. Finally, I shall try
to show that the conjunction of the two narratives has important
theoretical ramiﬁcations, as Plato fully acknowledged in his criti-
cism of irreligiosity in Laws , and could reinforce the negative
public perception of natural philosophy, as evinced in Aristopha-
nes’ Clouds. Correspondingly, I shall put forward some evidence
which suggests that Archelaus has a more important role in both
the Clouds and Laws  than is customarily acknowledged. More
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generally, I would like to show that Archelaus might have been
a more important ﬁgure in the intellectual life of classical Athens
than is usually thought.
In a way this is also an eﬀort to react to the recent trend of
leaving Archelaus completely out of the picture in standard refer-
ence works on the Presocratics. To be sure, I am not suggesting
that Archelaus was a philosophical genius by any standard. On the
other hand, I do wish to show that we can have a better under-
standing of the last generation of Presocratic philosophy, and the
reception of it in Athens, if we keep him in view. I believe that
he should receive at least the slimmest of chapters in future hand-
books of Presocratic philosophy, as he had once in Guthrie’s His-
tory and KRS.
 Archelaus had at least a brief discussion in W. K. C. Guthrie, A History
of Greek Philosophy [History], ii. The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to
Democritus (Cambridge, ), –, and a ﬁve-page chapter in G. S. Kirk,
J. E. Raven, and M. Schoﬁeld, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History
with a Selection of Texts [KRS] (Cambridge, ), –. Yet he is customarily
left out of more recent authoritative treatments of Presocratic philosophy. There
is not a single mention of him in P. Curd and D. W. Graham (eds.), The Oxford
Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy (Oxford, ), and he is left out of P. Curd
and R. D. McKirahan, A Presocratics Reader: Selected Fragments and Testimonia
(Indianapolis, ), and McKirahan’s more comprehensive Philosophy before
Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentary (Indianapolis, ). He is
missing from Dan Graham’s even more extensive selection of Presocratic frag-
ments (The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The Complete Fragments and Selected
Testimonies of the Major Presocratics (Cambridge, )), and his name occurs
in only a single footnote in A. A. Long (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Early
Greek Philosophy (Cambridge, ) (at  n. ). Again, no mention of him in
the two excellent recent introductions to the Presocratics, one by James Warren
(Presocratics (Stocksﬁeld, )) and another by Giannis Stamatellos (Introduction
to Presocratics: A Thematic Approach to Early Greek Philosophy with Key Readings
(Chichester, )). And the phenomenon is not limited to English-language publi-
cations. For instance, Archelaus is not included in either Christof Rapp’s collection
(C. Rapp, Die Vorsokratiker: Die Fragmente und Quellenberichte (Stuttgart, ))
or the new Reclam Vorsokratiker edited by J. Mansfeld with O. Primavesi (Die
Vorsokratiker (Stuttgart, )). Nor does he appear in Maria Michela Sassi’s
remarkable recent book on early Greek philosophy (Gli inizi della ﬁlosoﬁa: in
Grecia (Turin, )). And the list could be continued. The most recent syste-
matic appraisal of Archelaus is in V. Tilman, ‘Archélaos d’Athènes’ [‘Archélaos’],
Revue de philosophie ancienne,  (), –. For recent accounts of Socrates’
relationship to Archelaus see A. Patzer, ‘Sokrates und Archelaos: historische und
ﬁktionale Texte über den jungen Sokrates’ [‘Sokrates’], in W. von der Weppen and
B. Zimmermann (eds.), Sokrates im Gang der Zeiten (Tübingen, ), –, and
D. W. Graham, ‘Socrates on Samos’ [‘Socrates’], Classical Quarterly,   (),
–.
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II
Let me start with what we can know about the status of ethical to-
pics and Kulturentstehungslehre in Archelaus’ theory. For the time
being I shall skip the earlier stages of Archelaus’ cosmogony and
pick up the narrative when the macrocosmic structure is already in
place, the ﬂat earth is ﬁxed in the centre, and the heavenly bodies
are carried around it by the whirling air. Everything is thus there for
life to develop on earth, and indeed, from the earth. I am quoting
Hippolytus, one of our major sources on Archelaus:
περὶ δὲ ζῴων φησὶν ὅτι θερμαινομένης τῆς γῆς τὸ πρῶτον ἐν τῷ κάτω μέρει,
ὅπου τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐμίσγετο, ἀνεφαίνετο τά τε ἄλλα ζῷα πολλὰ καὶ
ἄνθρωποι, ἅπαντα τὴν αὐτὴν δίαιταν ἔχοντα, ἐκ τῆς ἰλύος τρεφόμενα—ἦν δὲ
ὀλιγοχρόνια—ὕστερον δὲ αὐτοῖς ἡ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσις συνέστη. (Hipp. Haer.
. . .= A  DK)
On the topic of the animals he says that when the earth was ﬁrst warmed
up in the lower part, where the hot and the cold were mixing, many other
animals as well as human beings appeared, all of which had the same regi-
men, given that they all were nourished by the mud. But they lived for a
short time. Later on generation from one another was established.
Hippolytus then continues (. . ):
καὶ διεκρίθησαν ἄνθρωποι ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἡγεμόνας καὶ νόμους καὶ τέχνας
καὶ πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα συνέστησαν.
And human beings got separated from the other animals, and leaders and
laws and crafts and cities were established.
This last bit, brieﬂy listing the topics covered in the rest of the story,
andmentioning the establishment of laws, political institutions, and
communities, is what Diogenes Laertius apparently refers to when
he writes in his introduction that Archelaus ‘also had a philosophi-
cal theory about laws and about the ﬁne and the just’. Regrettably,
 Alternatively: ‘but this only lasted for a short time’.
 Incidentally, the origin of life from the earth is probably the basis of yet
another account of Archelaus’ material principle. For according to Epiphanius,
‘Archelaus . . . the natural philosopher declared that it is from the earth that
everything was born. For this is the principle of the universe, as he said’ (De ﬁde . 
(Panarion . . )= A  DK). The account apparently ignores the previous stages
of Archelaus’ cosmogony, and hence suggests that truncated versions circulated
which started only with the emergence of life. As we shall see, this is also the point
that the Epicureans pick up from Archelaus.
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all we can know about the actual contents of this theory is what
Diogenes adds a little later, and according to which
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ. (D.L. . =
A  DK, part)
the just and the ignoble are not by nature but by convention.
Then, a further little snippet of information comes from the Suda’s
entry on Archelaus:
συνέταξε δὲ Φυσιολογίαν καὶ ἐδόξαζε τὸ δίκαιον καὶ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
νόμῳ. συνέταξε καὶ ἄλλα τινά. (Suda, s.v. Archelaus= A  DK)
He composed a work called Enquiry into Nature and taught that the just
and the ignoble are not by nature, but by convention. He also composed
some other works.
What is signiﬁcant in this testimony is not the title, but rather
that the formulation gives support to the point that Archelaus ex-
pounded his theory about the origins of moral norms in the work
in which he wrote about the origins of the cosmic order. It is this
work in which he discussed the just and the ignoble, mentioned also
by Diogenes, whereas he wrote some other works too, the contents
of which are not speciﬁed. (Incidentally, Plutarch, in Cimon . –
= B  DK, informs us that Archelaus also composed poetic
works.)
‘Is that all?’ you might ask; ‘Why all the brouhaha over this?’ For
indeed, it seems only natural that once you have conducted your
narrative about the history of the cosmos to the point where ani-
mal life and human beings emerge, you do not just stop there, but
continue the story and relate the origins of society and political in-
stitutions as well.
This was apparently the guiding intuition of GérardNaddaf, who
in The Greek Concept of Nature (originally published in French
under the title L’Origine et l’évolution du concept grec de phusis)
made a sustained eﬀort to show that the Presocratic tradition, all
through its history from Anaximander to Anaxagoras, from Ionia
to Italy, contained not only a cosmogony and a zoogony, but also
what Naddaf calls a ‘politogony’—by and large identical to what I
have been callingKulturentstehungslehre. Few, however, have found
 G. Naddaf, L’Origine et l’évolution du concept grec de phusis (Lewiston, NY,
Queenston, Ont., and Lampeter, ), and id., The Greek Concept of Nature (Al-
bany, NY, ).
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Naddaf’s attempt successful. As his reviewers, Malcolm Schoﬁeld
and Jaap Mansfeld, agree, Naddaf’s study has the merit of show-
ing negatively that even if one leaves no stone unturned, as Naddaf
does, one simply cannot ﬁnd the traces of ‘politogony’ in standard
Presocratic narratives. (It is worth noting, by the way, that Naddaf
has only two passing references to Archelaus in the whole book.)
So here is the question: if it seems so trivial that someone like
Archelaus continued his cosmogony with a Kulturentstehungslehre,
why are we unable to ﬁnd any sign of a comparable project in the
works of previous cosmologists?
III
Let me start with a historical point. It has often been observed
that the cosmogonical tradition issues from, or even starts with,
Hesiod’s Theogony. Now the Theogony tells us how from an as-
sumed initial stage the gods representing the major structural parts
of the physical world emerged, how the family of gods expanded
and populated this world, and how Zeus established and consoli-
dated his divine rule. The narrative, in its traditional version, stops
with the list of goddesses who bore children from mortal partners.
This limitation is understandable in so far as with this Hesiod has
fulﬁlled his announced programme of singing about the birth of the
deathless gods and goddesses (Th. ). After all, this is a theogony.
The result is that even though mortals are occasionally mentioned
in the poem, and we do hear about their origins (Th. –), we
hear nothing about the way in which their world is organized, and
how that structure came about. All that is left to another poem,
the Works and Days. It is also in the Works and Days that Hesiod
oﬀers an aetiology of the human condition by providing a narra-
tive about its origins. Gods are obviously actively involved in this
story as well, yet the focus is on human society. I am not claim-
ing that Hesiod’s division of subjects between theTheogony and the
Works and Days determined the scope of Presocratic cosmogonical
narratives—it could, however, have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on this as-
pect of the tradition.
 J. Mansfeld, review of G. Naddaf, L’Origine et l’évolution du concept grec de
phusis, in Mnemosyne,  (), –, and M. Schoﬁeld, review of G. Naddaf,
The Greek Concept of Nature, in Classical Review,   (), –.
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Surely, individual Presocratics could have their own theoretical
and other reasons for not going beyond anthropogony. These pos-
sible individual motivations notwithstanding, there seems to be at
least one overarching consideration, pertaining to the type of on-
tological and explanatory reductivism that characterizes much of
Presocratic natural philosophy. An explanatory framework which
operates with basic stuﬀs and elements, and the active mechanical
forces and dynamism among these elements, can deliver an account
not merely of the way in which the large-scale structures of the cos-
mos got organized, but also of how the same stuﬀs, under the eﬀect
of the same forces, build up the anatomy and physiology of human
beings and other animal species. Yet it is prima facie plausible to say
that the explanatory power of this basic ontology stops there. The
hot and the cold, air and ﬁre, condensation and rarefaction, have not
much purchase when it comes to explaining the origin of political
and cultural institutions.
Let me illustrate this point by reference to Anaxagoras. In his
seminal paper on the origins of social contract theory, Charles Kahn
also examined the question when or by whom Kulturentstehungs-
lehre was appended to cosmogony for the ﬁrst time. He admits ex-
plicitly that as far as the doxographical evidence goes, Archelaus is
clearly the ﬁrst on record. Kahn, however, wants to deny Archelaus’
originality, and claims, in a way comparable to Naddaf, that Kul-
turentstehungslehre had always been part of Ionian narratives from
the time of Anaximander. For this claim Kahn’s principal piece of
evidence is Anaxagoras  B a DK (=Simpl. In Phys. . –. 
Diels)—quite notably, nothing earlier comes into view. It will be
worthwhile to quote the fragment in toto:
τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων χρὴ δοκεῖν ἐνεῖναι πολλά τε καὶ παντοῖα ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς
συγκρινομένοις καὶ σπέρματα πάντων χρημάτων καὶ ἰδέας παντοίας ἔχοντα καὶ
χροιὰς καὶ ἡδονάς. καὶ ἀνθρώπους τε συμπαγῆναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα ὅσα ψυχὴν
ἔχει. καὶ τοῖς γε ἀνθρώποισιν εἶναι καὶ πόλεις συνῳκημένας καὶ ἔργα κατεσκευα-
σμένα, ὥσπερ παρ ᾿ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἠέλιόν τε αὐτοῖσιν εἶναι καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα,
ὥσπερ παρ ᾿ ἡμῖν, καὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῖσι φύειν πολλά τε καὶ παντοῖα, ὧν ἐκεῖνοι
τὰ ὀνήϊστα συνενεγκάμενοι εἰς τὴν οἴκησιν χρῶνται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μοι λέλεκται
περὶ τῆς ἀποκρίσιος, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν παρ ᾿ ἡμῖν μόνον ἀποκριθείη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλῃ.
These things being so, one must believe () that many and varied things are
in all the things that are combined, as are also seeds of all things, having
 C. H. Kahn, ‘The Origins of Social Contract Theory in the Fifth Century ’,
in G. Kerferd (ed.), The Sophists and their Legacy (Wiesbaden, ), –.
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all sorts of shapes, colours, and savours; () that humans were also com-
pounded and all the other animals that have souls. And also () that human
beings, for their part, have cities that have been constructed, andworks that
have been produced, just as with us; and () that they have sun and moon
and the rest, just as with us, and their earth grows many diﬀerent things, of
which they collect the most beneﬁcial and bring them into their houses to
make use of them. This is, then, what I had to say about separation—that
it would not happen only where we are, but elsewhere too.
What Anaxagoras argues for in this passage is that his cosmologi-
cal, physical explanatory theory has universal application. Given
that the initial conditions are the same in all regions of the original
mixture, the same cause will bring about the same eﬀect at diﬀer-
ent locations. First, it will result in the same astronomical macro-
structure: there will be earth, sun, and moon, and all the rest, at
other locations as well. Then, since the mixture contains the same
variety of seeds, the same life forms will develop elsewhere as well.
Furthermore, given that human beings have the same type of ra-
tionality at other possible locations as well, in the same environ-
ment they will form communities and develop the same material
culture. The ﬁnal sentence of the fragment is crucial. For it shows
that Anaxagoras has still been focusing on the eﬀects of cosmic se-
paration, and that his aim is to show to what extent its outcomes
are uniform. His claim is that the existence of cities and agriculture
is derivable from the initial spin in the primeval mixture. It seems
clear that the minds of humans assume a role at the last stages, and
their uniformity is part of the explanation. Anaxagoras is, however,
not interested in the actual reasonswhy human beings endowedwith
mind started to organize their communities, established their laws,
and began to consider some things just, others ignoble. In theories
of social contract, and more generally in Kulturentstehungslehren,
as we can see from the Critias fragment to Protagoras’ myth, up
until Lucretius, another level of explanation is operative, precisely
because the focus is no longer on cosmic forces, but on agency and
agents’ reasons—why people ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to agree on certain so-
cial norms, or why one person considers it useful to subdue others
by persuasion, manipulation, or force, and so on; or, alternatively,
how the diﬀerent gods taught humans diﬀerent skills, established
cultural, political, and religious institutions, and set the norms for
societies.
All this is, however, missing from Anaxagoras’ text. It is note-
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worthy that Anaxagoras could also have made reference to the
uniform working of nous, the rationality that is also inherent in
humans, in order to explain why they would come up with the
same kind of material culture and social institutions in diﬀerent
kosmoi. Anaxagoras’ overall framework contains the conceptual
and explanatory resources to come up with a naturalistic theory
of the origins of culture. But, quite remarkably, he does not men-
tion anything like that. Note also that the last sentence brings
a closure—this is how much Anaxagoras wanted to say on the
topic. Anaxagoras, then, mentions the emergence of cities and the
material culture of human beings—thus far Kahn is right. Yet
Anaxagoras is apparently interested in all this only in so far as
these phenomena are related to the cosmological processes: he is
not interested in them for their own sake. And this, I suggest, is
precisely why Diogenes Laertius’ characterization of Archelaus—
that he ‘seems to have touched upon ethics. For he also had a
philosophical theory [πεφιλοσόφηκεν] about laws and about the ﬁne
and the just’—cannot apply to Anaxagoras. There is in Anaxagoras
no proper philosophical reﬂection on the origin and nature of the
laws and social and ethical norms.
Before Imove on to the next section, let me add one further point.
One could object that at least some cosmologies, from the time of
Anaximander, operated also with ethical and political concepts—
and most notably with the notion of cosmic justice. It seems to
me, however, that even that will not pave the way for a Kultur-
entstehungslehre, precisely because such a cosmological account will
still lack agency and the normative reasons of agents which appear
central to Kulturentstehungslehre.
IV
At this point it will be worthwhile to take a brief look at the
Timaeus–Critias complex. It is a commonplace that the Timaeus,
among other things, is Plato’s reﬂection on the Presocratic cos-
mogonic tradition, and in a sense the culmination of that tradition.
Remarkably, Timaeus’ narrative also ends with an anthropogony
and zoogony, but does not continue with a Kulturentstehungslehre.
Even more remarkably, the dialogue does contain a Kulturentste-
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hungslehre, but put into the mouth of another character, Critias,
who initially states the distribution of topics:
ἔδοξεν γὰρ ἡμῖν Τίμαιον μέν, ἅτε ὄντα ἀστρονομικώτατον ἡμῶν καὶ περὶ φύσεως
τοῦ παντὸς εἰδέναι μάλιστα ἔργον πεποιημένον, πρῶτον λέγειν ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ
τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως, τελευτᾶν δὲ εἰς ἀνθρώπων φύσιν· ἐμὲ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον,
ὡς παρὰ μὲν τούτου δεδεγμένον ἀνθρώπους τῷ λόγῳ γεγονότας κτλ. (Tim.  
–)
We thought that because Timaeus is our expert in astronomy and has made
it his main business to know the nature of the universe, he should speak
ﬁrst, beginning with the origin of the world and concluding with the nature
of human beings. Then I’ll go next, once I’m in possession of Timaeus’ ac-
count of the origin of human beings, etc. (trans. Zeyl, modiﬁed)
Plato thus sticks to the traditional scope of the cosmogonical dis-
course and makes the cut after zoogony and anthropogony even
though he wants his dialogue to include a Kulturentstehungslehre.
The distribution of topics in the Timaeus is a further strong in-
dication that the traditional cosmogonic narratives extend only to
zoogony and anthropogony, and do not continue with a Kulturent-
stehungslehre.
The articulation between the respective speeches of Timaeus and
Critias has received a penetrating analysis in Sarah Broadie’s recent
book.Yet, while Broadie’s focus is on the relationship between cos-
mogony and history, what interests me in the present context is the
relationship between cosmogony and prehistory. One of the start-
ing points of Broadie’s analysis is the keen observation that Critias’
speech on antediluvian Athens oﬀers considerably more than what
Socrates originally requested. For Socrates did not ask for a ‘true’
story, and did not expect the story to be about Athens.Letme now
add a further point to this. Socrates did not ask for a story about the
origins of the city either; he only wanted to see the city—already es-
tablished and fully functional—interacting with other cities in war
and peace. The Egyptian priest, and following him Solon and Cri-
tias, nonetheless also tells the story of the foundation of Athens, the
origin of its inhabitants, and the ways in which their political system
and laws were ﬁrst established and their education introduced.
This part of the narrative is present in both Critias’ brief preli-
minary summary preceding Timaeus’ speech and the full, although
 S. Broadie,Nature and Divinity in Plato’sTimaeus [Nature] (Cambridge, )
ch. .  Ibid. .
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unﬁnished, account he oﬀers as a sequel to Timaeus’ grand mono-
logue. After somemethodological provisos ( –), Critias relates
in the longer version how the inhabited earth was divided up among
the gods, peacefully and by common consent, for strife would not
be ﬁtting for gods. In the next step the gods, each in their allot-
ted land, started to breed, shepherd, and guide human beings, not
by force but by persuasion. We then learn that Athena and He-
phaestus received a region in common because of the closeness of
their natures, and especially because of their shared love of arts and
wisdom. Athena was also given the seeds of the people of the land
from the earth and Hephaestus (Tim.  ). Then, either all by her-
self (as we have it in the preliminary summary) or with the help
of Hephaestus (according to the longer version in the Critias), she
nurtured the people of Attica, founded the city of Athens, educated
the people, and ‘gave them a conception of the political order’.
It soon turns out that Athena not merely taught the arts and sci-
ences to prehistoric Athenians, but also instructed them to estab-
lish a socio-political organization based on the separation of classes
that characterizes the city Socrates depicted on the previous day.
It is not only the bare outlines of the social structure that are due
to Athena. For instance, it can be derived from the martial nature
of the goddess that the city gives the same military training to men
and women.
It is by starting with a narrative of foundation that Critias can
make good his original promise of picking up Timaeus’ story at
the point when human beings are created; without a Kulturentste-
hungslehre, there would be a temporal, and more importantly also
an explanatory, gap between the two narratives. In important ways,
Critias’ prehistory seamlessly continues Timaeus’ narrative.
Note, however, that the main agents of Critias’ Kulturentste-
hungslehre—as opposed to the rest of his story—are not the human
beings created by the Demiurge and his auxiliaries in Timaeus’
account, but the gods. These gods, moreover, are not the cosmic,
or cosmological, gods, but the traditional Olympians, Athena,
Hephaestus, and their relatives. To be sure, the traditional gods do
make their appearance already in Timaeus’ narrative; the account
of their origin and natures, however, is explicitly demarcated from
 For a closely parallel account of divine shepherds of early peoples, see Laws ,
 – .
 Crit.   : ἐπὶ νοῦν ἔθεσαν τὴν τῆς πολιτείας τάξιν.
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Timaeus’ own discourse since it lies outside the purview of both
rational proof and likely reasoning. As Timaeus says:
περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων δαιμόνων εἰπεῖν καὶ γνῶναι τὴν γένεσιν μεῖζον ἢ καθ ᾿ ἡμᾶς,
πειστέον δὲ τοῖς εἰρηκόσιν ἔμπροσθεν, ἐκγόνοις μὲν θεῶν οὖσιν, ὡς ἔφασαν, σα-
φῶς δέ που τούς γε αὑτῶν προγόνους εἰδόσιν· ἀδύνατον οὖν θεῶν παισὶν ἀπιστεῖν,
καίπερ ἄνευ τε εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν, ἀλλ ᾿ ὡς οἰκεῖα φα-
σκόντων ἀπαγγέλλειν ἑπομένους τῷ νόμῳ πιστευτέον. οὕτως οὖν κατ ᾿ ἐκείνους
ἡμῖν ἡ γένεσις περὶ τούτων τῶν θεῶν ἐχέτω καὶ λεγέσθω. (Tim.   – )
As for the other divine beings, it surpasses our task to know and speak of
how they came to be. We should accept on faith the assertions of those ﬁ-
gures of the past who claimed to be the oﬀspring of gods. They must surely
have been well informed about their own ancestors. So we cannot avoid be-
lieving the children of gods, even though their accounts lack plausible or
compelling proofs [ἄνευ τε εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων]. Rather, we
should follow custom and believe them, on the ground that what they claim
to be reporting are matters of their own concern. Accordingly, let us accept
their account of how these gods came to be and state what it is. (trans. Zeyl,
modiﬁed)
Most commentators assume that Timaeus strikes an ironical tone
here with his reference to mythical poets speaking about their own
ancestors. I, for one, cannot believe this to be the case. Timaeus—
and at this point we can just as well speak of Plato—has no intention
of getting rid of the traditional gods, even if he is eager to purify the
traditional myths of all that is in conﬂict with his theological prin-
ciples about the supreme goodness of the gods.
The result is thus twofold. Critias’ narrative about the founda-
tion of the city is continuous with Timaeus’ narrative in so far as
all the main actors of Critias’ story are already put on the scene in
Timaeus’ account. Critias’ Kulturentstehungslehre is, however, dis-
continuous with Timaeus’ account in so far as the principal charac-
ters for the prehistory will be precisely those divine beings whose
origin and individuated characteristics are not derivable from the
explanatory principles of the rest of the cosmological account, and
are clearly ﬂagged as external additions. In a way, what Plato ex-
presses by Timaeus’ caveats is parallel to what we have seen in
 It is also noteworthy that he is referring not simply to the most traditional theo-
gonic narratives, such as that ofHesiod—Hesiod, after all, did not claim to be a direct
descendant of the gods—but to those of more ‘divine’ poets such as Orpheus. This
departure from Hesiod also allows him to start with Ouranos and Gaia, i.e. two cos-
mological gods who have been introduced in Timaeus’ own cosmological narrative,
and whose ‘birth’ is thus still part of Timaeus’ ‘likely story’.
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Anaxagoras: the same explanatory framework is not applicable to
cosmology and Kulturentstehungslehre. However, what the articu-
lation between Timaeus’ cosmogony and Critias’ prehistory shows
is that the diﬀerence between the two explanatory schemes cannot
be reduced to the diﬀerence between a mechanical, physical frame-
work on the one hand, and a rational agency-based model on the
other. In the Platonic context both sides are fundamentally based
on rational, goal-directed agency. Yet the two domains, as it turns
out, still resist explanatory uniﬁcation.
I shall not be able to give a full elucidation of this fact here. Let
me nonetheless oﬀer a few considerations. First, in so far as Critias’
narrative is continuous not only with Timaeus’, but even more so
with Socrates’ description of the just city, its status will be neces-
sarily diﬀerent. Timaeus’ account is meant to be aetiological and
explanatory of the way things are in the natural world around us
and constituting us. As opposed to this, Critias’ narrative may have
a comparable aetiological force only for the Egyptian society of the
ﬁctional world, where things are still supposed to be arranged in ac-
cordance with what was once established by the goddess. Because
of the series of cataclysms and other factors, nothing remains of this
in Athens—Critias’Kulturentstehungslehre can thus have no expla-
natory force regarding the state of aﬀairs there. On the other hand,
his narrative puts an ought on current-day Athenians by displaying
their divinely instituted and sanctioned original, but forgotten, so-
cial order. And it is at this point that Critias’ story might rejoin, at
another level, Timaeus’ explanation of the cosmic order, which also
puts an ought on us, at the level of the individual, by uncovering the
original, divinely instituted order in the rational souls of each of us,
an order to which we as individuals should return.
Furthermore, Critias’ account can explain the diﬀerences among
various constitutions without the charge of relativism. All of them
ultimately derive from gods, shepherding and educating human
beings, but the diﬀerent Olympians have diﬀerent characteristics.
Thus, the prehistoric Athenians could obtain the most philosophi-
cal political system because they received it from the goddess of
wisdom. Although Critias does not mention it, we can well imagine
that a city established, for instance, on the lot of Ares, the god of
war, was organized according to diﬀerent principles, just as the con-
stitution and characteristics of Atlantis are related to the fact that
their god is not Athena, but Poseidon. It is, however, not easy to
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see how such individualizing features of divine beings—as opposed
to humans—could issue from Timaeus’ top-down account. Yet the
cultural and political identity of the polis is based on its relation not
to some abstract cosmic divinities, but to its own personalized an-
cestral gods. The story related by the Egyptian priest is meant to
be to some extent revisionary, and is presented as a corrective to
the Athenian popular tradition. Nonetheless, it preserves those ele-
ments that were considered fundamental to Athenian identity, such
as the autochthony of Athenians and, even more crucially, their pri-
vileged relation to Athena.
This relationship is at the same time closely parallel to what we
can observe in Plato’s Laws. In his address to the citizens of the
new city, the Athenian explicitly circumscribes the groups of gods
who will be worshipped in the city: the Olympians, the chthonians,
daimones, heroes, and ancestral gods. However, the cosmological
argument of Laws , even if successful, will not deliver these gods
and other divine beings who are worshipped in the public rites of
the polis and who have a key role in providing the cohesion and cul-
tural identity of the community.
With this, we have of course arrived at the well-worn distinc-
tion between theologia naturalis and theologia civilis. Yet, the way
we have reached this point, starting from the question of the dis-
continuity between cosmogony and Kulturentstehungslehre, might
give some further shades to the picture. In particular, it might show
a further facet of the often remarked phenomenon that the public
showed no intolerance towards the demythologized explanations of
the physical world in Presocratic cosmologies prior to Anaxagoras’
trial in Athens. What ultimately counts for the polis is its special
relation to its ancestral gods: how they founded the city, what role
these gods played in the aetiological myths about the city’s cultic
places and practices, ancestral institutions, and skills. Yet, as we
have just seen, cosmologists were not supposed to say anything
on these topics, since their narratives stopped before they reached
these acts of foundation. Moreover, at least theoretically, cosmo-
logists could leave open the question whether and, if so, how the
traditional gods of the city could be incorporated into their world,
just as Timaeus could incorporate the traditional gods simply by
invoking tradition, and without integrating them into his explana-
tory framework.
At this point Anaxagoras fragment a DK (=Simpl. In Phys. .
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–.  Diels), considered above, becomes signiﬁcant again. For
even if as I have argued it does not include a Kulturentstehungs-
lehre proper, the reference to the role of cosmic separation in the
emergence of cities, agriculture, and crafts leaves very little room—
if any—for the involvement of gods in the organization of human
culture. Apparently, these cities do not need gods for their founda-
tion, and farming and viticulture can be learntwithoutDemeter and
Dionysus. It would obviously be foolish to suggest that fragment a
was the corpus delicti in the charge of asebeia against Anaxagoras.
But, at any rate, it must have rendered the task of the defence more
diﬃcult.
V
If the fusion of cosmogony and Kulturentstehungslehre was such a
notable and consequential innovation, and Archelaus was indeed
the ﬁrst, or one of the ﬁrst, to practise it, would we not expect
this innovation to have been noted by his contemporaries? But is
there any sign of this? In what follows, I shall try to show that
there are indeed strong indications that contemporaries did take
notice of it. However, let me ﬁrst make a preliminary remark, for
it is always tricky to try to attribute a signal achievement to an
apparently minor thinker. Note that all the evidence I have mar-
shalled and all the points I have made thus far do not commit me
to an image of Archelaus as one who carefully thought through all
these diﬃculties and factors, and made a break with tradition on
the basis of thorough theoretical considerations. It is just as pos-
sible that he learnt about physical theories becoming fashionable
around Anaxagoras, but that he also became acquainted with the
narratives of sophists such as Protagoras about the origins of socie-
ties and the diﬀerences among them, and simply stitched the two
types of narrative together, without giving much thought to it. Yet
even on such a scenario, others could have realized what the stakes
and possible ramiﬁcations of such a move are.
So, back to the question whether there are any signs that contem-
poraries understood the signiﬁcance of the innovation. As André
Laks has recently emphasized, we have two major documents in
which the Presocratic cosmological tradition is criticized for its
deleterious consequences for ethics and theology: Aristophanes’
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Clouds and Plato’s Laws . I would like to submit that the con-
junction of cosmological, physical doctrines and theories about the
origins of social and political norms in general, and the contribution
of Archelaus in particular, are material to both of these texts.
I have examined the presence of Archelaus in the Clouds in a se-
parate paper, so let me now limit myself to a summary of my prin-
cipal arguments.
Ever since Diels formulated the view, it has been customarily
held that even if the tenets Aristophanes puts into themouth of Soc-
rates are a ragbag of comically distorted doctrines coming from dif-
ferent sources, Socrates’ physical ‘theories’ are modelled on those
of Diogenes of Apollonia. This contention is primarily based on
Socrates’ ﬁrst exchange with Strepsiades, in which the philosopher
explains why he is suspended in a basket:
οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε
ἐξηῦρον ὀρθῶς τὰ μετέωρα πράγματα
εἰ μὴ κρεμάσας τὸ νόημα καὶ τὴν φροντίδα
λεπτὴν καταμείξας εἰς τὸν ὅμοιον ἀέρα.
(Clouds –)
For I would never discover things in the sky correctly except by suspending
mind and commingling my subtle thought with its like, the air.
According to the scholarly consensus, Socrates’ claim that his mind
or thought is similar to, or is the same as, air echoes the views of
Diogenes of Apollonia, as formulated, for example, in fragments 
and :
. . . ἄνθρωποι γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα ἀναπνέοντα ζώει τῷ ἀέρι. καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς
 A. Laks, Introduction à la ‘philosophie présocratique’ (Paris, ),  n. ; and
id., ‘Encore une histoire primordiale de la théorie’ [‘Encore’], in A. Laks and R.
Saetta Cottone (eds.), Comédie et philosophie: Socrate et les ‘présocratiques’ dans les
Nuées d’Aristophane (Paris, ), – at –.
 ‘Socrate et Archélaos dans lesNuées’, in Laks and Saetta Cottone (eds.), Comé-
die et philosophie, –.
 H. Diels, ‘Über Leukipp und Demokrit’ [‘Leukipp’], in Verhandlungen der .
Vers. der deut. Philologen und Schulmänner zu Stettin  (Leipzig, ), –.
For the most detailed statement of this view see P. Vander Waerdt, ‘Socrates in the
Clouds’ [‘Socrates’], in P. VanderWaerdt (ed.),The Socratic Movement (Ithaca, NY,
and London, ), –. See also Laks, ‘Encore’. For detailed studies on the pre-
sence of other Presocratics in the Clouds see the papers collected in Laks and Saetta
Cottone (eds.), Comédie et philosophie, and M. Rashed, ‘Aristophanes and the Soc-
rates of the Phaedo’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,  (), –.
 Translations from the Clouds are by Henderson with occasional modiﬁcations.
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καὶ ψυχή ἐστι καὶ νόησις . . . (Simpl. In Phys. .  Diels= B  DK,
part)
. . . humans and other animals live by means of air, by breathing it. And
this is for them both soul and intelligence . . .
καί μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τὴν νόησιν ἔχον εἶναι ὁ ἀὴρ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων . . .
(Simpl. In Phys. . – Diels= B  DK, part)
And it seems to me that that which has intelligence is what men call air . . .
Moreover, in fragment  Diogenes maintains also that air is divine
and steers all things, which could then be parodied by Socrates’
divinization of all the airy phenomena: the Air, the Aither, and the
Clouds.
What is not taken into account, however, is that there is perfectly
good ancient evidence to show that Archelaus, too, taught the re-
levant doctrines about both the relationship between mind and air
and that between air and god. First, Sextus in his survey of the dif-
ferent archai lists Archelaus together with Diogenes:
Α᾿ναξιμένης δὲ καὶ ᾿ Ιδαῖος ὁ ῾ Ιμεραῖος καὶ Διογένης ὁ Α᾿πολλωνιάτης καὶ
Α᾿ρχέλαος ὁ Α᾿θηναῖος, Σωκράτους δὲ καθηγητής, καὶ κατ ᾿ ἐνίους ῾Ηράκλειτος
ἀέρα [sc. πάντων εἶναι ἀρχὴν καὶ στοιχεῖον]. (S.E.M. . = A .  DK)
 Simpl. In Phys. . – Diels: καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου πάντας καὶ κυβερνᾶσθαι καὶ πάν-
των κρατεῖν· αὐτὸ γάρ μοι τοῦτο θεὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀφῖχθαι καὶ πάντα διατιθέναι
καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἐνεῖναι (‘and all men are steered by this and that it has power over all
things. For this very thing seems to me to be a god and to have reached everywhere
and to dispose all things and to be in everything’).
 It has also been claimed that Socrates should think that his elevated position in
the basket is conducive to superior cognitive achievements because the air is purer
and drier higher up; a belief which—the argument goes—is based onDiogenes’ view
that purer and drier air is better for intelligence, and that the air is purer and drier
higher above the ground: ‘Thought, as it has been said, is caused by pure and dry
air; for a moist emanation inhibits the intelligence; . . . That moisture removes in-
telligence is indicated by the fact that other living creatures are inferior in intellect,
for they breathe the air from the earth and take to themselves moister sustenance.
Birds breathe pure air, but have a constitution similar to that of ﬁshes’ (Thphr. De
sens. ). Yet, despite the surface resemblance, this cannot be Socrates’ reason, for he
speciﬁes in the verses immediately following the above quotation that ‘If I had been
on the ground and from down there examined what is up, I would have made no
discoveries at all; the earth, you see, simply must forcibly draw to itself the moisture
of thought. The very same thing happens also to the watercress’ (Clouds –). In
other words, he is high up in the basket not in order to breathe the purer and drier air
higher above the ground, but rather in order to prevent the earth from ‘dehydrating’
his intelligence; for his cognitive tasks it is preferable to have a due proportion of hu-
midity in his mind. This clearly implies another model than the one put forward by
Diogenes of Apollonia. (Cf. P. Demont, ‘Socrate et le cresson (Aristophane, Nuées,
v. –)’, in Stylus: la parole dans ses formes. Mélange Jacqueline Dangel (Paris,
), –, repr. in Cahiers du théâtre antique,  (), –.)
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Anaximenes and Idaeus of Himera and Diogenes of Apollonia and
Archelaus of Athens, Socrates’ teacher, and according to some Heraclitus
[say] that the air . . . is the principle and element of all things.
To this Aëtius adds that Archelaus took the air to be god:
(τίς ἐστιν ὁ θεός) Α᾿ρχέλαος ἀέρα καὶ νοῦν τὸν θεόν. (Aët. . . = A DK,
part)
Archelaus (maintained that) the god is air and mind.
So this is not a good enough reason to prioritize Diogenes. Then,
there are further, more speciﬁc, points that are supposed to demon-
strate that Aristophanes’ Socrates must be drawing on the doctrines
of Diogenes of Apollonia. For instance, Socrates in the Clouds calls
the air ‘boundless’ and ‘immeasurable’ ( ἀμέτρητ ᾿ ;  ἀπέραν-
τον), on which VanderWaerdt comments: the ‘view that the natural
principle of air is “boundless”, to which only Diogenes among the
pre-Socratics subscribed’.This is, however, ﬂatly contradicted by
Aëtius, showing that Archelaus, too, thought that the air is inﬁnite:
(περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τί εἰσιν) Α᾿ρχέλαος Α᾿πολλοδώρου Α᾿θηναῖος ἀέρα ἄπειρον, καὶ
τὴν περὶ αὐτὸν πυκνότητα καὶ μάνωσιν. (Aët. . . = A .  DK, part)
Archelaus, the son of Apollodoros, of Athens [held that the principle is] the
inﬁnite air with its condensation and rarefaction.
Moreover, in the ﬁrst verse mentioning the boundless air, Socra-
tes claims that the Air keeps the earth aloft (: ὃς ἔχεις τὴν γῆν
μετέωρον)—a view that is also supposed to reﬂect Diogenes’ views.
But, yet again, this view is attributed to Archelaus as well. Diogenes
Laertius tells us that Archelaus taught that the circular motion of
the aither dominates the atmospheric air, which in turn dominates
the earth; something that may be parodied in the Clouds in the
gibes about the supreme rule of Dinos. In sum, all of the doctrines
that are customarily listed as evincing the inﬂuence of Diogenes of
Apollonia are also attributed to Archelaus. If so, I would maintain,
it is much more economical to consider Aristophanes’ Socrates as
taking his views from Archelaus rather than from Diogenes. It is
important to note once again that Archelaus was after all well known
 Text from Diels–Kranz.  Vander Waerdt, ‘Socrates’, .
 Text from Mansfeld and Runia (unpublished).
 D.L. . = A  DK, part: ὅθεν ἡ μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος, ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ πυρὸς
περιφορᾶς κρατεῖται (‘Wherefore the earth is dominated by the air, whereas the air is
dominated by the circular motion of ﬁre’).
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to the Athenian public as the ﬁrst local natural philosopher. What
is more, he was considered to be Socrates’ companion and teacher
not only by the entire subsequent tradition, but already by their
contemporaries, such as Ion of Chios, whereas we have no direct
evidence of the immediate inﬂuence of Diogenes on contemporary
Athenian life.
Indeed, even Plato appears to acknowledge that Socrates was
inﬂuenced by Archelaus’ physical ideas. Speaking about his early
encounter with natural philosophy in the Phaedo, the very ﬁrst
question Socrates mentions is the following: ‘Is it when the hot
and the cold start to decompose, as some people were saying, that
living things grow into a unity?’ (trans. Long). This is gener-
ally accepted by commentators on the Phaedo to be a reference to
Archelaus’ theory of the origin of living beings.Burnet evenmade
the intriguing suggestion that the ‘someone’ whom Socrates heard
reading from the book of Anaxagoras (Phaedo   ) is most likely
to be the most important Athenian follower of Anaxagoras and the
 D.L. . = A  DK, part; Suda, s.v. Archelaus= A  DK; Hipp.Haer. .
= A  DK, part; Simpl. In Phys. .  Diels=Thphr. Phys. op. a FHS&G
ad ﬁn.= A  DK; S.E. M. . = A  DK; Aug. Civ. Dei . = A  DK;
Cic. Tusc., . ; [Gal.]Hist. phil. . ; John of Damascus (?), Passio s. Artemii mar-
tyris  Kotter. On the relationship between Socrates and Archelaus see Tilman,
‘Archélaos’, –, with bibliography.
 FGrH iii. F=D.L. . = A .  DK: Ἴων δὲ ὁ Χῖος καὶ νέον ὄντα εἰς
Σάμον σὺν Α᾿ρχελάῳ ἀποδημῆσαι (‘Ion of Chios said that he [sc. Socrates], when he
was young, made a trip to Samos with Archelaus’). The question of how this re-
port can be squared with Plato’s claim that Socrates never left Athens has been re-
peatedly examined; cf. most recently Graham, ‘Socrates’. Patzer, ‘Sokrates’, –,
shows conclusively, at least to my mind, that Ion’s report is historically correct, and
moreover that Ion’s wording and the structure of the text exclude the possibility that
Socrates and Archelaus travelled together to Samos as part of the Athenian mili-
tary campaign, as has sometimes been suggested; the reference must be to a private
journey.
 Cf. C. H. Kahn, ‘Greek Religion and Philosophy in the Sisyphus Fragment’,
Phronesis,  (), – at  n. : ‘The inﬂuence of Diogenes of Apollonia on
Athenian thought of the ﬁfth century seems to be a ﬁgment of modern scholarship
without basis in the text.’
 Phaedo   –: ἆρ ᾿ ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ, ὥς τινες
ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῷα συντρέφεται;
 J. Burnet, Plato’s Phaedo [Phaedo] (Oxford ), ad loc., with reference to
Hippolytus’ testimony in  A  DK, on which see more below. Burnet adds that
‘It is signiﬁcant that Socrates should mention the theory of Archelaus ﬁrst.’ The
identiﬁcation of the reference to Archelaus is accepted by most commentators; cf.
e.g. D. Bostock, Plato’s Phaedo (Oxford, ), ad loc.; M. Schoepﬂin, Platone: Fe-
done (Rome, ), ad loc.; F. Trabattoni and S. Martinelli, Platone: Fedone (Turin,
), ad loc., etc.
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companion of Socrates: Archelaus.On the other hand, it is equally
easy to see why Plato—and for that matter Xenophon—had a vested
interest in dissociating Socrates from Archelaus as far as possible.
For both political and philosophical purposes, Plato had good rea-
son to suppress Socrates’ possible connections with natural philo-
sophy, as he clearly does in theApology. This is especially so if, as I
shall suggest in the next section, Plato fully realized the dangerous
ramiﬁcations of Archelaus’ views.
Be that as it may, the Clouds appears to contain even more speci-
ﬁc references to Archelaus’ doctrines, such as the theory about the
physiology of hearing, and the close similarity between Socrates’
explanation of the thunderbolt (Clouds –) and Archelaus’ ac-
count of earthquakes (Sen. Nat. . = A a DK).
But there is more—and this will ﬁnally bring us back to the con-
nection between natural philosophy and ethics. As we have seen,
our ancient sources emphasize that Archelaus ‘also had a philo-
sophical theory about laws and about the ﬁne and the just’ (D.L.
. = A a DK, part). As it happens, this corresponds very
closely to the way in which the Weaker Argument introduces itself
in the second part of the Clouds:
ἐγὼ γὰρ ἥττων μὲν λόγος δι ᾿ αὐτὸ τοῦτ ᾿ ἐκλήθην
ἐν τοῖσι φροντισταῖσιν, ὅτι πρώτιστος ἐπενόησα
τοῖσιν νόμοις καὶ ταῖς δίκαις τἀναντί ᾿ ἀντιλέξαι.
(–)
For this very reason I’ve earned the name Weaker Argument in intellec-
tual circles, because I pioneered contriving how to argue against nomoi and
things that are just. (trans. Henderson)
Later, young Pheidippides brags about his newly acquired under-
standing of the nature of the nomoi (–), which also enables him
to despise established customs. Close to the very end of the play
we then learn something about what exactly Pheidippides learnt
from the Weaker Argument. When his father points out that it is
 Burnet,Phaedo, –. See approvingly e.g. R. Hackforth,Plato: Phaedo (Cam-
bridge, ),  n. : ‘Whether or not we take this incident as historical, it is na-
tural, as Burnet says, to think of the reader as Archelaus, the successor of Anaxagoras
at Athens.’
 This is already mentioned in Diels’s original study as a point of contact with
Archelaus (‘Leukipp’,  n. ).
 –: ὡς ἡδὺ καινοῖς πράγμασιν καὶ δεξιοῖς ὁμιλεῖν καὶ τῶν καθεστώτων νό-
μων ὑπερφρονεῖν δύνασθαι (‘How sweet it is to be acquainted with novel and clever
things, and to be able to look down upon established customs’).
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nowhere the custom that sons beat up their fathers, Pheidippides
answers:
οὔκουν ἀνὴρ ὁ τὸν νόμον θεὶς τοῦτον ἦν τὸ πρῶτον,
ὥσπερ σὺ κἀγώ, καὶ λέγων ἔπειθε τοὺς παλαιούς;
ἧττόν τι δῆτ ᾿ ἔξεστι κἀμοὶ καινὸν αὖ τὸ λοιπὸν
θεῖναι νόμον τοῖς υἱέσιν, τοὺς πατέρας ἀντιτύπτειν;
ὅσας δὲ πληγὰς εἴχομεν πρὶν τὸν νόμον τεθῆναι,
ἀφίεμεν, καὶ δίδομεν αὐτοῖς προῖκα συγκεκόφθαι.
σκέψαι δὲ τοὺς ἀλεκτρυόνας καὶ τἄλλα τὰ βοτὰ ταυτί,
ὡς τοὺς πατέρας ἀμύνεται· καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν
ἡμῶν ἐκεῖνοι, πλήν γ ᾿ ὅτι ψηφίσματ ᾿ οὐ γράφουσιν;
(–)
Well, wasn’t it a man like you and me who originally established this law
and persuaded by speech the ancients to adopt it? If so, am I any less al-
lowed to establish in my turn a new law for the sons of tomorrow, that
they should beat their fathers back? We award amnesty to fathers for all
the blows we got before the law took eﬀect, and we waive compensation
for our beatings. Consider how the roosters and other such beasts avenge
themselves on their fathers. And after all, how do they diﬀer from us, ex-
cept that they don’t write decrees? (trans. Henderson)
There are two conspicuous points in Pheidippides’ reasoning: ﬁrst,
that nomoi in general, and whether it is just or ignoble to beat one’s
father in particular, are strictly human constructs. Humans diﬀer
from other animals only in that they make laws; indeed Strepsi-
ades continues by pressing his son on the point that there is no sub-
stantial diﬀerence between humans and beasts. The second point
is that the laws can be changed and the new law has the same au-
thority as the previous one. These points correspond closely to the
little we can know about Archelaus. As we have already seen, Dio-
genes Laertius informs us that according to Archelaus ‘the just and
the ignoble are not by phusis but by nomos’.More importantly, we
have Hippolytus’ doxography about Archelaus’ view on the simi-
larity and diﬀerence between humans and non-human animals that
I have already quoted at the beginning of the article as a piece of
evidence for the conjunction of Archelaus’ physical theory andKul-
turentstehungslehre:
καὶ διεκρίθησαν ἄνθρωποι ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἡγεμόνας καὶ νόμους καὶ τέχνας
καὶ πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα συνέστησαν. νοῦν δὲ λέγει πᾶσιν ἐμφύεσθαι ζῴοις ὁμοίως·
 D.L. . = A  DK, part: καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ
νόμῳ.
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χρῆσθαι γὰρ ἕκαστον καὶ τῶν ζῴων ὅσῳ τὸ μὲν βραδυτέρως, τὸ δὲ ταχυτέρως.
(Hipp.Haer. . . = A  DK, part)
And human beings got separated from the other animals, and leaders and
laws and crafts and cities were established. He says that mind is inborn in
all animals alike. For each of them uses mind to varying degrees, one more
slowly, another more quickly.
So, once again, all the salient ethical positions of the second part
of the play are attributed to Archelaus by the doxographical tradi-
tion. Incidentally, it is worth noting that bringing Archelaus into
the limelight also oﬀers an answer to a puzzle concerning the struc-
ture of the Clouds. For it has often been claimed that there is no
intrinsic connection between the ﬁrst part, in which physical doc-
trines are parodied, and the second, in which Aristophanes turns
to ethical relativism. Just as Diogenes of Apollonia is supposed to
be the prime candidate for the source of the ﬁrst part, Protagoras
or other sophists are customarily mentioned for the second part,
without, however, implying either that Diogenes also subscribed
to a relativist ethics or that Protagoras advocated the relevant phy-
sical doctrines. Yet, as I have tried to show, with Archelaus we ﬁnd
someone who apparently held both the physical and the ethical doc-
trines that are mocked in the play, who was moreover considered to
be an associate of Socrates by their contemporaries, and who, as an
Athenian, was obviously well known to the audience. If we accept
that Archelaus is in the background of Socrates’ presentation, the
apparent problem about the relationship between the two parts of
the play also disappears. Just as importantly, Aristophanes presents
Socrates in the play as particularly dangerous precisely because of
the conjunction of his subversive theology in the ﬁrst part and his
subversive ethics in the second.
My claim is not that Archelaus is the unique source of the ideas
put into Socrates’ mouth by Aristophanes, who could obviously
throw all kinds of other ingredients into the comic mix. None-
theless, at the very least there are strong reasons for thinking that
Archelaus is considerably more relevant to the Aristophanean por-
trayal of Socrates than is usually thought—indeed, just as Archelaus
is missing from recent comprehensive treatments of the Presocra-
tics, there is not a single mention of him in standard commentaries
on the Clouds from Dover through Meineck to Guidorizzi.
 Accepting the reading of the manuscripts.
Created on 22 November 2016 at 13.15 hours page 23
 Gábor Betegh
VI
Let me now turn to Plato’s Laws. As commentators customarily
note, the arguments in Laws  against the proper atheists, the
ﬁrst version of irreligion, present some puzzling features. For in-
stance, there is some uncertainty as to who is targeted when the
Athenian describes and argues against the theoretical basis of the
atheist views, and seems to speak both about Ionian-type natural
philosophers in general and about a more speciﬁc theory or theor-
ies with deﬁnite contours.However, commentators agree that this
speciﬁc cosmological theory presented by the Athenian is diﬃcult
to relate to any of the prima facie relevant Presocratic theories.
As readers will have already guessed, I would like to suggest that
Archelaus is material to the theory presented by the Athenian.
The ﬁrst clue is this. The Athenian expresses repeatedly that the
type of atheism he is describing, and the cosmological doctrines that
are the immediate causes of it, are concentrated in Athens (cf.  )
and are, moreover, fairly recent. The Athenian doubts whether his
interlocutors are acquainted with such texts and people, whereas,
as he says, he himself has encountered them personally. This de-
scription of the doctrines forming the theoretical basis of the athe-
ist viewwould best ﬁt those natural philosophers who pursued their
activity in Athens—such as, most prominently, Anaxagoras and his
presumed disciple Archelaus, renowned for being the ﬁrst local phi-
losopher to propagate Ionian philosophy in Athens.
Next, the most patent sign of their scandalous doctrines is that
they treat the heavenly bodies—which all peoples honour as gods—
as consisting of mere stones and earth. Many details about the trial
of Anaxagoras are unclear and controversial, but if we can say any-
thing about it with a fair degree of certainty, it is that the main in-
dictment against him was his theory about the heavenly bodies, and
in particular that the sun and moon are made of earth and stones.
This is also the view that, according to Plato’sApology, Meletus at-
 D. Sedley, ‘The Atheist Underground’ [‘Underground’], in V. Harte and M.
Lane (eds.), Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy (Cambridge, ), –.
For on overview of alternative hypotheses concerning the identity of the theorists
targeted see ibid.  n. . Cf. also the arguments by J. Tate, ‘On Plato: Laws X
’ [‘Laws’], Classical Quarterly,  (), – at , for a single theory tar-
geted.
 Cf. e.g. R. Mayhew, Plato: Laws  [Laws] (Oxford, ), –.
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tributed, apparently falsely and by contamination, to Socrates (Ap.
 ). Indeed, taking the sun to be a stone or clod remained syno-
nymous with atheism. Even in such detheologized contexts as the
Placita literature, authors could indicate their outrage by insert-
ing in otherwise factual inventories of doxai an ἐτολμήσαν (‘dared
to’) when they arrived at Anaxagoras’ view (cf. Ach. Tat. Isag. 
Maass–DiMaria ad init. (not in DK)). And even those authors who
for their own Judaeo-Christian theological commitments did not
treat the heavenly bodies as gods (e.g. Philo, Aet. ; Aug. Civ. Dei
. ) could still ﬁnd Anaxagoras’ view about the material con-
stitution of heavenly bodies particularly repugnant and an obvious
indication of atheism.
Archelaus apparently followed Anaxagoras on this speciﬁc point.
As Aëtius informs us:
Α᾿ρχέλαος μύδρους [ἔφησεν εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας], διαπύρους δέ. (Aët. . . =
A  DK)
Archelaus (declared that the heavenly bodies are) clumps of iron, but in-
ﬂamed. (text and translation from Mansfeld and Runia, modiﬁed)
It is remarkable that the Sisyphus fragment, which, as David Sed-
ley has argued, may be crucial in identifying the primary targets
of Laws , uses the very same word mudros, ‘clump of iron’ or
‘ingot’, to describe the sun (l. ). At the same time, this point can
exclude some other possible candidates, such as Antiphon, who ap-
parently took the sun to be ﬁre (cf. Aët. . . = B  DK).
Although the material constitution of the heavenly bodies is
an important point of contention, the kernel of the Athenian’s
argument concerns the priority and motor function of soul. As the
Athenian complains, these outrageous and injurious thinkers teach
that the elements and the opposites are primary, that they come
to be and exist ﬁrst by nature, whereas soul derives from physical
stuﬀs ( ); these thinkers thus ‘deny the priority of what was in
fact the ﬁrst cause of the birth and destruction of all things, and
regard it as a later creation’ ( , trans. Saunders). To illustrate
that these thinkers deny the motor function of soul, the Athenian
gives some details of their theory. Most of these theorists, says
 Note also that when a little later, at   –  , the Athenian speaks about
the bodies of the heavenly gods, he says that they must be ﬁre or some kind of air
(σῶμα αὑτῇ πορισαμένη πυρὸς ἤ τινος ἀέρος).
 Sedley, ‘Underground’.  More on Antiphon below.
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the Athenian, posit a stage of the cosmos when everything comes
together to a standstill. The Athenian then points out the ab-
surdity of trying to introduce motion into this motionless mixture
not by the eﬀect of the self-moving soul, but by the mechanical
interaction of physical stuﬀs. Note that for the argument of the
Athenian it is important that the criticized theory posits such a
motionless state. Because it is motionless, the holders of the theory
need to give an account of the origin of motion. Moreover, this
temporal starting point of cosmogony requires that they establish
the temporal priority relations between the elements and the soul—
what was there from the beginning, what was generated later, in
what order, and so forth.
The expression τὰ πάντα ὁμοῦ γενόμενα (‘everything having come
together’,   ) and the image of the motionless stage obviously
remind the reader of Anaxagoras. Indeed, the conjunction of the
earthy/stony sun and moon and the expression τὰ πάντα ὁμοῦ γε-
νόμενα strongly suggests that the target must be someone close to
Anaxagoras. Just as clearly, Anaxagoras himself is not a suitable tar-
get because in his theory Mind is not posterior to, or derived from,
the elements and the opposites, and, moreover, it is precisely not the
elements and the opposites that initiate motion, but the Mind. At
the same time, the argument is ill-suited as an attack on the atom-
ists, for they explicitly deny that there ever was or will be such a
motionless state.
Let me try to show that these worries do not arise in the case
of Archelaus. For this purpose I need to have a closer look at the
cosmological and physical fragments. The evidence is lamentably
scarce; however, the testimonies do provide the outlines and make
up a fairly coherent narrative. As usual, the ultimate source is prob-
ably Theophrastus, who, according to the catalogue of his works in
Diogenes Laertius, devoted a book-length study to Archelaus (D.L.
. ). Incidentally, this is a further indication that Archelaus was
considered to be a notable thinker in Athens: indeed, on this count,
Archelaus is on a par with Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Democritus,
Diogenes (either of Apollonia or of Sinope), and Empedocles,
to whom Theophrastus apparently consecrated one book each;
Theophrastus wrote no book on, say, Hippo. Be that as it may, the
starting point of most doxographies stemming from Theophrastus
   : εἰ σταίη πως τὰ πάντα ὁμοῦ γενόμενα.
 Mayhew, Laws, –.
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is Archelaus’ dependence on his presumed teacher Anaxagoras.
In this vein Simplicius, quoting Theophrastus, presents him as a
rather unimaginative epigone:
καὶ Α᾿ρχέλαος ὁ Α᾿θηναῖος, ᾧ καὶ Σωκράτη συγγεγονέναι φασὶν Α᾿ναξαγόρου γε-
νομένῳ μαθητῇ, ἐν μὲν τῇ γενέσει τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πειρᾶταί τι φέρειν
ἴδιον, τὰς ἀρχὰς δὲ τὰς αὐτὰς ἀποδίδωσιν ἅσπερ Α᾿ναξαγόρας. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν
ἀπείρους τῷ πλήθει καὶ ἀνομογενεῖς τὰς ἀρχὰς λέγουσι, τὰς ὁμοιομερείας τιθέν-
τες ἀρχάς. (Simpl. In Phys. .  Diels=Thphr. Phys. op. a FHS&G
ad ﬁn.= A  DK)
Archelaus of Athens, of whom they say that Socrates was an associate, and
who was himself a pupil of Anaxagoras, tried to bring in some personal
contribution in cosmogony and other subjects, but gave the same account
of the principles as did Anaxagoras. So these men say that the principles
are unlimited in number and diﬀerent in kind, and posit the homoeomeries
as principles.
We learn more about the initial state of cosmogony, as well as about
Archelaus’ relation to Anaxagoras, from part of the long testimony
by Hippolytus:
εἶναι 〈δὲ〉 ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως 〈τὸ〉 ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἀπ ᾿ ἀλλήλων τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ
ψυχρόν, καὶ τὸ μὲν θερμὸν κινεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν ἠρεμεῖν. (Hipp. Haer. . .
= A  DK, part)
(Archelaus maintained that) the origin of movement is the separation of the
hot and the cold from one another, and the hot moves and the cold stays
still. (trans. Fortenbaugh, modiﬁed)
Identifying the separation of the hot and the cold as the origin
of motion clearly implies that the initial state was motionless,
whereas the emphasis on separation indicates that initially they
were mixed. This is highly signiﬁcant for our present purposes.
For it shows that although the description of the initial state is
close to Anaxagoras’—i.e. a motionless mixture—Archelaus re-
jected Anaxagoras’ most remarkable innovation, namely that Mind
introduced motion into this standstill. Incidentally, these reports
about the separation of the hot and the cold being the archē of
motion can explain why some later sources, such as Hermias in
 A  DK, thought that Archelaus’ principles are the hot and
 Cf. also Hipp. Haer. . . = A  DK, part: ‘He spoke about the mixture of
matter in a way similar to Anaxagoras, and in the same way about the principles.’
 Cf. also D.L. . . –= A  DK, part: ἔλεγε δὲ δύο αἰτίας εἶναι γενέσεως,
θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν (‘He said that there are two causes of generation, hot and cold’).
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the cold. Making the separation of hot and cold from an original
mixture the starting point of the birth of the cosmos is at the
same time highly reminiscent of the beginning of Anaximander’s
cosmogonic narrative (cf. [Plut.] Strom. = A  DK). At any
rate, this is clearly the type of account about the origin of motion
that the Athenian presents as his target.
But what about mind, then? In Archelaus’ theory, Mind appar-
ently loses not only its motor function, but also its fundamental
Anaxagorean characteristic—its purity. AsHippolytus puts it in the
sentence immediately preceding the one I have just quoted:
τῷ νῷ [codd. τῶ νόω] ἐνυπάρχειν τι εὐθέως μίγμα. (Hipp. Haer. . . =
A  DK, part)
There was a certain mixture inhering in mind right from the start.
This, once again, shows that the original state was a mixture as in
Anaxagoras, with the notable diﬀerence of mind being part of the
mixture. The same point might hint at the reason why mind cannot
have the same function here as in Anaxagoras. To this we should
add what we have already seen in the context of the Clouds, viz.
that a number of sources clearly state that Archelaus adhered to the
more traditional Ionian view, attested from Anaximenes to Dio-
genes of Apollonia, according to which mind—which he may or
may not have distinguished from soul—is air or airy (Aët. . . =
 A  DK, part). Most notable among these is the Aëtian chapter
on god that I quoted earlier. At that point, however, I left out the
ﬁnal words of the lemma. The full text runs like this:
 One caveat could be that the joint eﬀect of Simplicius’ andHippolytus’ testimo-
nies is that the primary ingredients for Archelaus appear to be the Anaxagorean-type
elements, whereas the theory described by the Athenian starts with the four ele-
ments. I do not mean to minimize this discrepancy; but we shall see that the
ﬁrst steps of the cosmogony of Archelaus are about the generation of the four
elements.
 M. Marcovich, Hippolytus: Refutatio omnium haeresium (Berlin, ),
emends the text to read αὐτὸς δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνυπάρχειν τι εὐθέως 〈τῷ〉 μίγμα〈τι〉.
 The report is echoed in Aug. Civ. Dei . : ‘Anaxagorae successit auditor eius
Archelaus. etiam ipse de particulis inter se similibus, quibus singula quaeque ﬁerent,
ita putauit constare omnia, ut inesse etiam mentem diceret, quae corpora aeterna, id
est illas particulas, coniungendo et dissipando ageret omnia’ (‘Anaxagoras was suc-
ceeded by his disciple Archelaus. The latter also held that the universe is composed
of homogeneous particles out of which each individual thing was made. But he also
held that mind is inherent in them, which governs the universe by conjoining and
separating eternal bodies, that is, those particles’).
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(τίς ἐστιν ὁ θεός) Α᾿ρχέλαος ἀέρα καὶ νοῦν τὸν θεόν, οὐ μέντοι κοσμοποιὸν τὸν
νοῦν. (Aët. . . = A  DK)
Archelaus (maintained that) the god is air and mind; mind, however, is not
maker of the cosmos.
The last tag—‘mind, however, is not maker of the cosmos’—is, once
again, noteworthy in the present context. For it appears as a strong
recognition of the fact that in Archelaus’ theory mind had an even
less prominent role than in Anaxagoras’, and, arguably, air/mind
had also a lesser part in organizing the cosmos than in Diogenes
of Apollonia. On the other hand, this identiﬁcation of mind, and
god, as air must be the motivation behind the alternative tradition,
which takes air, and not the homoeomeries or the hot and the cold,
to be Archelaus’ archē. For as we have seen above, the two most
important lists of archai—S.E.M. . = A .  DK (the most
extensive inventory we have) and Aëtius’ chapter περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν
τί εἰσιν—enlist Archelaus among those who teach that the air is the
principle. The formulation in Aëtius is particularly noteworthy:
(περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τί εἰσιν) Α᾿ρχέλαος Α᾿πολλοδώρου Α᾿θηναῖος ἀέρα ἄπειρον, καὶ
τὴν περὶ αὐτὸν πυκνότητα καὶ μάνωσιν. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶναι πῦρ τὸ δ ᾿ ὕδωρ.
(Aët. . . = A . )
Archelaus, the son of Apollodoros, of Athens (held that the principle is)
the inﬁnite air with its condensation and rarefaction. Of these the former
is water, the latter ﬁre.
Once again, this is much more redolent of Anaximenes than of
Anaxagoras. As a matter of fact, the return to the Ionian model
of the intertransformation of the elements along some quantitative
scale is the denial of Anaxagoras’ theory ofmatter based on the prin-
ciples of ‘everything in everything’ plus ‘predominance’. Piecing
these bits together, it appears that Archelaus did not after all slav-
ishly follow Anaxagoras, but combined his theory with more tradi-
tional Ionian doctrines.
When we turn to the later stages of the cosmogony, we soon
understand why the air/mind/god of Archelaus could not function
as the primary operative agent in arranging the cosmos. Singling
out the separation of hot and cold as the origin of motion, and
thereby the initial step in the cosmogonic process, and maintain-
ing that air was part of the mixture, already suggests that it was not
 Text from Diels–Kranz.
 Text after Mansfeld and Runia (unpublished).
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there from the beginning in its pure, separated-out form. This is
borne out by the admittedly rather obscure account in Hippolytus,
paralleled also in the testimony of Diogenes Laertius:
εἶναι 〈δὲ〉 ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως 〈τὸ〉 ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἀπ ᾿ ἀλλήλων τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ
ψυχρόν, καὶ τὸ μὲν θερμὸν κινεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν ἠρεμεῖν. τηκόμενον δὲ τὸ
ὕδωρ εἰς μέσον ῥεῖν, ἐν ᾧ κατακαιόμενον ἀέρα γίνεσθαι καὶ γῆν· ὧν τὸ μὲν ἄνω
φέρεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ὑφίστασθαι κάτω. (Hipp.Haer. . . = A  DK, part)
(He also maintained that) the origin of movement is the separation of the
hot and the cold from one another, and the hot is moved, whereas the cold
stays still. When water is melted, it ﬂows into the middle, where, having
been burnt up, it becomes air and earth, of which the former is carried
upwards, whereas the latter settles below.
This text, speaking about the generation of air together with earth,
strongly suggests that elemental air appeared at a later stage of the
cosmogonic process. Making the air derivative marks Archelaus’
distance from other earlier and contemporary air theorists, such as
Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia, whose respective divine/
air/minds are clearly primary, and part of the original ontological
furniture of the world—a further indication that Archelaus pared
down the role of cosmic intelligence. At the same time, this corres-
ponds once again remarkably well to the theory presented by the
Athenian: soul is derivative and appears only at a later stage of the
cosmogonic process.
One may object at this point that the Athenian’s targets are those
who deny that there are gods. As a counter to this, we have just
seen that air is also god for Archelaus. I do not want to minimize
the force of this objection; indeed, as far as we can see Archelaus
was not included in the ancient list of atheists. It is also true, as
I have just tried to show, that in Archelaus’ account the air is not
only distanced from the traditional gods, but has even lost all the
prerogatives that the divine ﬁrst principles of other Presocratics re-
tained. It is neither prior, nor a source of motion, nor again a prin-
cipal factor in cosmogony, nor again unmixed. In fact, it is hard to
see what its divinity could consist in at all. Moreover, we simply do
not know whether or not Archelaus included the traditional gods at
any point of his story. Even more important, the Athenian seems
to make a distinction between the views of the atheists on the one
hand, and the physical theories that form the basis of the atheists’
 I owe this point to David Sedley.
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views on the other. It is entirely conceivable that Archelaus could
be included among those who developed theories that fuelled athe-
ist views, without himself being taken as one of the representatives
of atheism proper.
Finally, Laws  leads me back to where I started—the conjunc-
tion of cosmogony and Kulturentstehungslehre. For the pernicious
theoreticians of Laws  continue their narrative about the origins
of the cosmos and living beings with an account about the origins
of the arts, crafts, and the nomoi that organize the life and set the
respective value systems of diﬀerent communities. Two points have
to be emphasized in this respect: ﬁrst, that for the coherence of the
position it is crucial that these steps, from the origin of cosmogonic
motion down to the nomoi of communities, are presented as stages
of one continuous narrative; it is only through this comprehensive,
continuous account that the contrast between what comes about by
nature, what comes about by art, and what comes about by nomoi
can become fully conspicuous. As Tate has rightly pointed out in
his argument against those previous commentators, such as Taylor
and England, who had thought that the Athenian is just stitching
together a Presocratic-type cosmological theory with a Kulturent-
stehungslehre from the sophists: ‘[t]his is one argument, not a con-
ﬂation of two’.Second, we have also seen that this kind of compre-
hensive narrative was far from being the traditional norm, but was
rather introduced by some people, such as Archelaus, in the lifetime
of Socrates. This fully bears out the contention of the Athenian that
what we have here is a fairly recent phenomenon.
As the Athenian emphasizes, these people declare that all the
crafts and all politics and customs (nomoi) are human creations and
can be changed, even if some of the arts, such as medicine and agri-
culture, have some share in nature. Gods, on the other hand, are
denied any role in the emergence of any of these aspects of hu-
man culture. Indeed, the gods themselves exist by the nomoi of the
diﬀerent communities, and are arrived at by the agreement of the
lawgivers. Then the Athenian adds:
 Cf. e.g.   : οἱ τὴν τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι.
 Tate, ‘Laws’, . The importance of this continuity is also evident from the dia-
grammatic presentation of the stages of the theory in Sedley, ‘Underground’, .
   –: θεούς, ὦ μακάριε, εἶναι πρῶτόν φασιν οὗτοι τέχνῃ, οὐ φύσει ἀλλά τισιν
νόμοις, καὶ τούτους ἄλλους ἄλλῃ, ὅπῃ ἕκαστοι ἑαυτοῖσι συνωμολόγησαν νομοθετούμενοι
(‘The ﬁrst thing they claim about the gods, my dear friend, is that they exist by
art, not by nature but by certain conventions, which are diﬀerent at diﬀerent places,
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καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ καλὰ φύσει μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ δὴ δίκαια οὐδ ᾿
εἶναι τὸ παράπαν φύσει, ἀλλ ᾿ ἀμφισβητοῦντας διατελεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μετατιθεμέ-
νους ἀεὶ ταῦτα, ἃ δ ᾿ ἂν μετάθωνται καὶ ὅταν, τότε κύρια ἕκαστα εἶναι, γιγνόμενα
τέχνῃ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις ἀλλ ᾿ οὐ δή τινι φύσει. (  –  )
And in particular they claim that ﬁne things by nature diﬀer from ﬁne
things by conventions, whereas nothing at all is just by nature, but people
continue to disagree with one another, and keep altering these things [i.e.
what is considered just], and every modiﬁcation becomes binding at that
time, even though it has come into being by art and by conventions, but in
no way by any nature. (trans. Mayhew)
I do not want to claim that our information about Archelaus is very
speciﬁc. Nonetheless, it seems to me that what the Athenian says
once again accords remarkablywell with the little we know—the hu-
man origin of laws, cities, and crafts, a philosophical theory about
the ﬁne and the just, and the view that the just and the ignoble in
particular are not by nature but by convention.
Admittedly, the evidence is cumulative rather than decisive. But
remember what we were looking for: a theory current especially in
Athens, relatively recent, advancing a speciﬁc physical, cosmogonic
theory, which is close to that of Anaxagoras but denies the cos-
mogonic role of mind, taking the elements to be the source of mo-
tion, and one which continues in a narrative about the conventional
origins of human institutions and norms. All possible caveats not-
withstanding, I ﬁnd the match with Archelaus remarkable.
VII
Some readers might have been wondering for some time why I
have not given fuller consideration to ﬁgures who are customar-
according to the way in which the lawgivers agreed among themselves’ (trans. May-
hew, modiﬁed)).
 At this point at least I am not completely alone in seeing Archelaus in the back-
ground of the Athenian’s argument. On the basis of arguments often overlapping
with those I have marshalled, Tate, ‘Laws’, , arrives at the following conclusion:
‘Now Archelaus was an Athenian and probably taught his doctrines at Athens. May
we not assume that his Athenian disciples treated his doctrines in the same way as he
himself had treated those of Anaxagoras, modifying them in the direction of purely
mechanical materialism and ethical subjectivism? If so, we can at last understand
what argument Plato is attacking. It is the popular and somewhat eclectic materi-
alism of fourth-centuryAthens, which, whatever it may owe to other sources, owes
most to the teaching of Anaxagoras and his Athenian disciple, Archelaus.’
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ily mentioned in the context of the relationship between physics
andKulturentstehungslehre, andmost of all to Antiphon andDemo-
critus. My strategy has been to make—as I hope—a strong case for
Archelaus and only then to turn to other contenders. It is of course
not my aim to deny their relevance; I still wish to suggest, how-
ever, that they are comparatively less relevant, and especially less
relevant for my two target texts, the Clouds and Laws .
Let me start with Antiphon. He is certainly a close competitor
for a number of roles I have attributed to Archelaus. In particu-
lar, some scholars have claimed that it is primarily Antiphon who is
parodied in the Clouds. Most speciﬁcally, it has been maintained
that Pheidippides’ tirade about fathers mistreating their sons and
sons retaliating should be seen as a direct reference to Antiphon 
B , col. . – DK. Whether or not we should take this as a
direct reference to Antiphon, I have highlighted that what is theor-
etically more prominent in Pheidippides’ position is the denial of a
natural distinction between humans and beasts; the diﬀerence is not
in cognitive capacities but only that humans have nomoi, without
any essential distinction. Against this, Antiphon appears to recog-
nize a much more pronounced intrinsic diﬀerence between humans
and animals when he writes that ‘human beings are themost divine-
like among all the animals’.
It has also been argued that Antiphon is pre-eminent in the
Athenian’s argument in Laws . There is hardly any doubt that
the way in which Antiphon distinguished the respective roles
of nomos and phusis, and in particular the dynamic but com-
pletely value-neutral conception of phusis, is relevant to the theory
described by the Athenian. There are, on the other hand, non-
negligible details that make it, I think, unlikely that Antiphon was
the Athenian’s main target: for instance, he took the sun and the
moon to be ﬁery, as opposed to consisting of mere earth and stone,
and there is little reason to think that he had a cosmogonical theory
close to Anaxagoras’.
 G. J. Pendrick, Antiphon the Sophist: The Fragments [Antiphon] (Cambridge,
),  n.  with earlier bibliography.
 See most recently M. Bonazzi, ‘L’uomo, gli dei, le bestie: a proposito
dell’antropologia di Antifonte’ [‘L’uomo’], Elenchos,  (), – at –
 (after an excellent account of Antiphon’s philosophical anthropology). See,
however, Pendrick, Antiphon, –.
  B  DK: ἄνθρωπος, ὅς φησι μὲν πάντων θηρίων θεειδέστατον γένεσθαι.
 Bonazzi, ‘L’uomo’, .
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Crucially, it is more diﬃcult to ascribe to Antiphon the type of
continuous, integrated narrative that, as I have argued, is so im-
portant in the context of the polemics in Laws . Let me very
brieﬂy review the relevant evidence. First and foremost, it is true
that the two books of Antiphon’s On Truth apparently contained
both a Presocratic-type physical theory and a fairly detailed and ori-
ginal ethical theory. Fragments – clearly contain the vestiges of
a cosmological and astronomical theory that included the ubiqui-
tous cosmic rotation ( B  DK), argued that the moon has its
own light ( B  DK), and, somewhat surprisingly, subscribed to
the Heraclitean doctrine that the heavenly bodies are hollow bowls
that collect the ﬁery evaporations ( B  and  DK). Other frag-
ments show a broad range of interests covering various standard
topics pertaining to natural philosophy: the origin of the saltiness
of the sea, earthquakes, human physiology and pathology. In the
ethical and political fragments the nomos–phusis antithesis appears
to play a prominent part. In particular, the three sections of frag-
ment  explain that nomoi constitute justice, but are imposed on
man’s nature and are to be followed only when someone else ob-
serves the action. When there is no witness around, man should
rather follow what is advantageous by nature.
Yet Antiphon’s On Truth apparently embraced an even broader
range of subjects, including such properly geometrical questions as
the squaring of the circle (B DK).This at least raises the possi-
bility thatOnTruthwas not conceived as a single continuous narra-
tive from a cosmogonical initial state to the present state of social in-
stitutions, but rather as a work in which Antiphon showed his com-
prehensive knowledge, and pronounced his views on all possible
issues that were discussed in intellectual circles. This impression
is strengthened by further considerations. For instance, the frag-
ments on cosmology and natural philosophy are explicitly ascribed
to the second of the two books ofOn Truth, whereas a great number
of scholars consider that fragment , which discusses the nomos–
phusis antithesis, comes from the ﬁrst book. An indication of this
is that Antiphon’s famous thought experiment, mentioned by Aris-
totle, to determine the nature of a chair—viz. that it is wood and
not its structure—is explicitly assigned to the ﬁrst book. The emer-
ging picture is that the nomos–phusis distinction and the ensuing
ethical discussion preceded the discussion of physical topics. It is
of course possible that Antiphon wanted to provide an integrated
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theory; these indications, however, suggest at the very least that he
did not put it forward in the form of a continuous linear narrative.
Moreover, there is very little evidence to show that the theory about
justice and the nomos–phusis antithesis was expounded through, or
in the context of, a narrative about the origins of social and cul-
tural institutions. Indeed,Maria Serena Funghi, who has produced
the most developed argument for a Kulturentstehungslehre in Anti-
phon, had to base her case merely on the aorist of the uncertainly
restored verb συν εχώρη[σαν.But even if we accept the supplement,
translate A  as ‘Each group agreed to their satisfaction . . . and
enacted laws’, and agree that Antiphon explained the diﬀerences
between diﬀerent local customs and norms with reference to the
way in which they were ﬁrst introduced, this does not oblige us to
think that he gave this account in direct continuation of his cos-
mogonical account. As we have seen, this explanation about nomoi
most likely preceded the account about the birth of the cosmos. All
in all, it seems to me that although Antiphon’s book could very well
contain all the relevant topics, and much more, he did not present
them as one continuous narrative.
The case for Democritus is in a way more intriguing, partly be-
cause the arguments can be made on a considerably wider textual
basis. For, if we accept the thesis put forward by Gregory Vlas-
tos and developed byMaria Michela Sassi, Democritus might have
used the same explanatory framework for his physics and his ethical
theory. Even more importantly for my present purposes, Thomas
Cole has made a sustained eﬀort to show that Vlastos’s suggestions
can also be transferred to the relationship betweenDemocritus’ cos-
mogonical theory and his narrative about the origins and develop-
ment of society. I cannot discuss these arguments in full detail
here. As to Vlastos’s claim, let me simply state that I ﬁnd C. C. W.
Taylor’s considerably more circumscribed view more persuasive:
 Funghi, P. Oxy. , in Oxyrhynchus Papyri,  (), –; contra Pendrick,
Antiphon, .
 P. Oxy. , fr. A, col. , . –: κατὰ τὸ ἀρέ[σκον συν εχώρη[σαν ἑκαστοι [. . .]
καὶ τοὺς νόμ[ους ἔθεν το.
 G.Vlastos, ‘Ethics and Physics inDemocritus’,Philosophical Review,  (),
–, and ibid.  (), –, repr. in R. E. Allen and D. J. Furley (eds.), Stu-
dies in Presocratic Philosophy, vol. ii (London, ), –, and in G. Vlastos,
Studies in Greek Philosophy, ed. D. W. Graham, vol. i (Princeton, ), –;
and M. M. Sassi, Le teorie della percezione in Democrito (Florence, ).
 T. Cole,Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology [Democritus] (Cleve-
land, ).
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Democritus surely made his atomist physics and his ethics compa-
tible, yet he did not try to draw any ethical conclusions from his
physics. So, for instance, any ethically relevant state of the soul is
also a physical state of the atomic aggregate constituting the soul,
yet there is absolutely no evidence in Democritus’ fragments that
he would have tried to provide a physical description of ethically re-
levant states of the soul in terms of the physical states of the compo-
nent atoms, or, conversely, that he would have tried to elicit ethical
conclusions from the physical description of the soul.
Although he presents his suggestions as closely continuous with
those of Vlastos, Thomas Cole’s thesis is in fact somewhat diﬀer-
ent. Instead of claiming that Democritus drew conclusions about
the development of society from the description of the underlying
atomic states, Cole suggests that Democritus described cosmogony
and the origin of society on the basis of an analogy: just as the kos-
moi qua atomic aggregates are formed as growing rhusmoi of atoms
whirling in vortices, so also societies qua aggregates of individuals
are formed as growing rhusmoi of quasi-atomic individual human
beings ﬁrst haphazardly getting together and colliding.
This is undoubtedly a fascinating hypothesis.Without subjecting
it to a critical scrutiny, let me make some very brief remarks about
its relevance to the major claims of my discussion. First, a chro-
nological point. Although the dates of both authors are uncertain,
there are reasons to think that Archelaus, an older contemporary of
Socrates, came ﬁrst. But even if their theories were contemporary,
or even if Democritus came earlier, there is no reason to think that
Archelaus was directly inﬂuenced by him. Everything we know
about Archelaus’ theory, and everything our ancient sources tell
us about its pedigree, suggests that he developed it on the basis
of Anaxagoras’, combining it with some older Ionian doctrines,
such as the intertransformation of elements through condensation
and rarefaction. Moreover, even if, against all odds, Archelaus
was inﬂuenced by Democritus in linking the two narratives, it
was Archelaus, not Democritus, who was the more prominent
ﬁgure in the eyes of the Athenian public in this respect. There is
no signiﬁcant trace of Democritus in Aristophanes’ portrayal of
Socrates in the Clouds, and Democritus’ theory does not ﬁt the bill
 C. C. W. Taylor, The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus (Toronto, ),
–.
 Cole, Democritus, –.
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for the speciﬁcs of the physical theory advanced by the Athenian in
Laws .
VIII
The most detailed and best-known surviving conjunction of cos-
mology and Kulturentstehungslehre comes in Lucretius’ poem, and
there is of course no denying that Democritus’ relevant views play a
prominent role in Epicurean theory. Yet, as it happens, we also have
unmistakable traces that Lucretius—surely following Epicurus—
integrated a number of elements of Archelaus’ theory. For instance,
all commentators on Lucretius agree that the image of the earth
nourishing the ﬁrst generation of the newly born animals with a
milk-like slime echoes Archelaus’ idea that the diﬀerent animal
species that emerged from the hot earth were ﬁrst fed on milk-
like mud.
But there was apparently more. For as Diogenes Laertius in-
forms us:
μάλιστα δὲ ἀπεδέχετο, φησὶ Διοκλῆς, τῶν ἀρχαίων Α᾿ναξαγόραν, καίτοι ἔν τισιν
ἀντειρηκὼς αὐτῷ, καὶ Α᾿ρχέλαον τὸν Σωκράτους διδάσκαλον. (D.L. . , not
in DK)
Of all the ancient philosophers, says Diocles, he [sc. Epicurus] approved of
Anaxagoras—even if on some points he contradicted him—and Archelaus,
the teacher of Socrates.
I cannot help thinking that what earned Epicurus’ qualiﬁed appre-
ciation of Anaxagoras, and the apparently even fuller approval of
Archelaus, was not such particular details of physical theory as the
 D.L. . . –= A  DK, part: γεννᾶσθαι δέ φησι τὰ ζῷα ἐκ θερμῆς τῆς γῆς καὶ
ἰλὺν παραπλησίαν γάλακτι οἷον τροφὴν ἀνιείσης· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ποιῆσαι (‘He
says that the animals grow from the hot earth, as it spews up mud resembling milk
as a sort of nourishment; this is also how it produced human beings’). Cf. Lucr. .
–: ‘hoc ubi quaeque loci regio opportuna dabatur, crescebant uteri terram ra-
dicibus apti; quos ubi temporematuro patefecerat aetas infantum, fugiens umorem
aurasque petessens, convertebat ibi natura foramina terrae et sucum venis cogebat
fundere apertis consimilem lactis . . .’ (‘So, where a suitable place was given, wombs
grew fastened to the earth by roots, and when in due time the age of infants had
broken these open, ﬂeeting the moisture and seeking the breezes, nature redirected
there pores of the earth and forced juice-like milk to ﬂow from open veins . . .’ (trans.
Campbell)). Cf. G. Campbell, Lucretius on Creation and Evolution: A Commentary
on De rerum natura Book Five, Lines – (Oxford, ), ad loc. with further
bibliography, and Tilman, ‘Archélaos’, –.
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milk-like mud, but much rather the overall project of giving a uni-
ﬁed, non-teleological account of the origin of the cosmos and the
origin of human society and culture.
Christ’s College, Cambridge
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